An Analysis of Farmers\u27 Agricultural Policy Preferences: by Orazem, Peter F. et al.
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
5-1988







Iowa State University, medelman@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, Behavioral Economics Commons, Economic Theory
Commons, and the Finance Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orazem, Peter F.; Otto, Daniel M.; and Edelman, Mark A., "An Analysis of Farmers' Agricultural Policy Preferences:" (1988). Economic
Staff Paper Series. 185.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/185
An Analysis of Farmers' Agricultural Policy Preferences:
Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical methodology to analyze public attitudes toward competing
public policies. The model is applied to data on Iowa farmers' opinions of four agricultural policies: continuing
the current program, targeting benefits to fiscally stressed farmers, mandatory acreage controls, and shifting to
a free market. The results show that a farmer's financial situation, size and type of operation, education, and
farm experience significantly influence his opinions. Attitudes toward mandatory controls and targeting are
most sensitive, and attitudes toward continuation of the current program are least sensitive to changes in
economic characteristics. Strong identi fiable camps of both support and opposition are found for each policy
except the current program.
Disciplines
Agribusiness | Behavioral Economics | Economic Theory | Finance
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/185
AN ANALYSIS OF FARMERS' AGRICULTURAL
POLICY PMFERENCES: AN ORDERED PROBIT*APPROACH
Peter F. Orazeni) Daniel M. OttO) and Hark A. Edelman*
Iowa State University
Economics Department
Staff Paper Number 185
May 1988-
* Drs. Orazem, .Otto and Edelman are respectively Assistant Professor
and Associate Professors in the Department of Economics at Iowa State
University. We thank Fran Antonovitz, Arne Hallam, Wallace Huffman,
Jim Kliebensteiii, Joanne Tokle, and Pat Westhoff for useful comments.
Journal Paper No. J-12977 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics
Experiment Station, Ames: Project No. 2537.
ABSTRACT
An Analysis of Farmers' Agricultural Policy Preferences:
An Ordered Probit Approach
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical methodology to
analyze public attitudes toward competing public policies. The model is
applied to data on Iowa farmers' opinions of four agricultural policies:
continuing the current program, targeting benefits to fiscally stressed
farmers, mandatory acreage controls, and shifting to a free market. The
results show that a farmer's financial situation, size and type of
operation, education, and farm experience significantly influence his
opinions. Attitudes toward mandatory controls and targeting are most
sensitive, and attitudes toward continuation of the current program are
least sensitive to changes in economic characteristics. Strong identi
fiable camps of both support and opposition are found for each policy
except the current program.
' : . An-Analysis of ' " •
Farmers* Agricultural Policy Preferences:
An Ordered Frobit Approach
Ifhile apparent interest and innovations in agricultural issues
typically intensify before the drafting of co^rehensive farm policy
legislation, the mix of policy tools adopted are selected from a
relatively finite array of policy options (Cochran; Boschvitz; Harkin).
The broad range of diverse agricultural interests and options available
makes consensus on a policy framework or reform in^robable.
Understanding who supports various policy proposals and under what
circumstances those preferences change would be helpful to policymakers
and analysts in assessing likely support and in developing strategies to
alter support. This paper dievelops a theoretical model, eii^)irical
Strategy, and an analysis of results for one data set to provide this
understanding•
In recent years, there have been several surveys of farmersf
opinion on government agricultural policies. Topically, the results of
these sui^eys are reported as the proportion of all respondents who
support a given policy initiative (Guither et al.; Jordan and Tweeten).
Some analysts have disaggregated farmers into groups and theii have
reported the level of support for the policies within each group (Zulauf
et al.; Coughenour and Christenson; Padgitt and Lasley), Others have
focused on correlation between policy preferences and socioeconomic
variables (Edelman and Lasley; Lasley et al.). While these studies
provide much information, ^they have left three important questions
unanswered. There is little understanding of why or how farmers form
their opinions.
whether distinctive groups of farmers hold certain preferences and how
farmers' opinions will change in the future.
Studies that concentrate on average responses of farmers in a given
group or correlations may yield misleading interpretations because other
factors are not held constant. Group averages, in particular, may
disguise heterogeneity of farmers within the group. For escan^le, if
farmers with gross farm income above $200,000 are defined as a group,
there may be considerable variation in gross farm inccnne and in farmers'
opinion that is not accurately captured by the group mean.
Here we attempt to solve the methodological and theoretical diffi~
culties encountered in previous studies of farmisrs' opinions.on agri
cultural policy.
I. THEORY
We assume that farmers face a range of potential governn^t agri
cultural policies. Afarmer will support policies that are ejected to
b^efit him relative to the ejected value of the alternative policies.
A farmer will oppose policies whose relative expected benefits are
negative. Afarmer will be indifferent or uncertain about policies that
are expected to be neither beneficial nor harmful relative to alterna
tive policies. Alternatively, one could say that a farmer will be
indifferent toward policies whose eaq)ected benefits relative to the
policy alternatives are not significantly different from zero.
We assume that farmers attempt to maximize the present value of
profit from their operations. If this is correct, then fanner support
of various government policy alternatives should be subject to the same
type of rent-seeking behavior that is commonly assumed in derived. input
demand or output supply applications;-^. < '
To begin, suppose that there are n-possible mutually exclusive
governmental policies that might potentially-belapplied in agriculture;
S , S , .... S Each of these policies has^an associated probability
of implementation, ^2* "*'^n' that H-.Pg + ... "*• ° -
The expected present value of profit conditional-upon the in5>lementation-
of policy evaluiated-in period;.zero will bet' ^
(1) E( z =n^(n^) ;
t«0
where E is the expectation operator, B is the discount factor, 0 < B <
1, is the profit under policy at time t, and is the informa
tion set the operator has upon which to base his expectations of future
profit at tijne zero.
We can construct an espected present value of profit under all
3/- - . ...
possible policies as:-
(2) n°(Q^) =Pin^(o^) +Pj n^(0o).+ •••• +F„n"(Qgj
so that the farmer's unconditioned esqiected profit will be the weighted
sum of the conditional expected present values of profit under each
policy, with the.probability of policy i's occurrence being the weight
associated with n (n ).
o •
If a farmer supports an individual agricultural policy, it must be
because he expects that the present value of profit under this
particular policy significantly dominates his current e:q)ected present
o Ayvalue of profit, 11 (Q^).— Alternatively, the farmer will be indifferent
to a policy if its expected present value is not significantly different
from n^(Q^) and will reject a policy if its e^^ected present value is
significantly less than 11^(Q^). Suppose that the fanner's forecasts are
subject to error so that the difference between expected profits-under
policy i and the unconditioxial expected profit can be written as TI^- 11°
n^+ where is an error term with,variance o^. The degree of
uncertainty surrounding rises as o^ increases. If the farmer is
risk-averse, he will .select critical values for. which will^determine '
his attitudes toward policy i. Using and as these critical
values, we can summarize the fanner's decision regarding a given policy
. , . e - 'I *
j
1 as:
.o,(3) -« < n (Q^) - n (0^) < => oppose policy i
< n^(n ) - n°(Q ) < -> indifferent about i
•^1 . , o o *^2
<II^CQq) - <•*«"> support policy i
Holding constant attitudes toward risk, will be for policies
with larger o^. Fanners who are risk neutral will set °
Hence, evidence that is significantly larger than Uj can be taken as
consistent with risk- averse behavior.-'' ' '
If the values of i = 0, ..., n, were known, we could
directly determine the policies that a specific farmer would support. ^
Such data are not available, but we can observe elements in the informa
tion set, Q . Typically, the elements of 0 will be characteristics of
o
the farmer and the farm. This means that we can study why farmers
support a given policy by examining how measures of support are
5correlated with variables believed ,to be in - To'see this, we can-
take a linear approximation of the function nf(Q^) as:
nj
(4) - I B '^X. + e^ -
j»l J J
where X, is one of n farm or farmer characteristics in the information
J / ' . ' " \ ' -v '• j"*' ,
set, pj is the effect of Xj on e3q)ected profit \inder policy S^, and
e^ is an approximation error assumed to be uncprrelated with X., j*"l»
n. If we define a variable to be an observed indicator of farmer
support for policy S., we can write the empirical approximation of (3)
as:
(5) = 0 if -" < + u'-<
. y '• T ' , .1 ' ' 1 , i
=> 1 if <T^.+ u^< ^2
° 2 if ^2 < ^ u^< +- ;
where •« p^- p° is a Ixri vector of parameters, X is the nxl vector of
elements in the information set, and e^ - e° is a vector of
approximation errors. ' If is distributed normally with mean zero and
variance one, (5) is an ordered probit specification.—^ • '
The estimates of 7-^ will yield information on each farm character
istic's impact oh es^ected profit under policy i'relative to the
characteristic's e^^ected (or probability weighted average) effect
across all potential policies. A significantly positive parameter
estimate in^lies that the corresponding charactieristic is more'
profitable than average under policy i. Farms that have large '
endowments of this characteristic will form a natural constituency in
'/..'v.
I •
support of policy i. Conversely, ;a negative parameter estimate iji5>lies ,
that the returns to the characteristic are lower than average under
policy i, and farms with large endoments of this characteristic form a
natural constituency in opposition to the policy. A small or
insignificant parameter estimate iji^lies that the characteristic is
' • ' " If \ •
neither more nor less profitable than average under policy i."
The parameters, can all be estimated as well as the threshold
parameters, subject to a normalizing restriction on the threshold
parameters. In the estimation we report below, was set equal to
zero. This restriction does not affect the signs or significance of the
results. Even so, the restriction that 112 = 0 seems natural since the
interpretation is that farmers will oppose -policies whose eaqjected
present value is smaller than the mean e:q)ected.value across all
policies. Asignificant coefficient on ^2 is.evidence consistent with
risk-averse behavior since that would imply ® ° Also, because
the distribution for is assumed to be standa.rd normal for each policy
i, the difference between demonstrate the
relative degree of uncertainty in,estimating future profits under the
various poHcies, Policies with larger (smaller) estimates of ^2
have larger (smaller) forecast error variances, r .
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The next step in analjrai^ farmer support for various farm policies
is to-specify potential elements in.the information set. In principle.
we .could include any number of variables <since theoretically,; the weight
attached to spurious infonnation would be.zero. However, nonlinear
estimation in^oses some constraints on .the- number of variables to admit
in terms of cost and con5>lexity of estimation; -.Furthermore,-the inter
pretation of the coefficients is more straightforward if spurious
regressors are excludedi j
The variables that we included in the ;specification were chosen as
representative of the following theoretical variables that would be
expected to enter the confutation of expected present value of profit*
First, we incorporate infonnation on the farmer's hum^ capital. Hore
skillful.'operators would benefit more from policies that allow more.,
freedom of action, whereas .less .ab,le.:.operators may, benefit more from.
policies that.are further.removed^,from a.free market. ; More e3q)erienced
farmers would also expect to have more skill,and, thus, higher relative
benefit from freeing up agricultural markets. • . - .
Policies will differ in their impact on profitability of different
types of operations. For exan^le, policies that-raise commodity prices
may aid cash grain.operations relative, to livestock or dairy operations.
Policies that make an input like land artificially scarce may dispropor
tionately benefit large, farms relative to small•farms. If policies are .
designed to:transfer benefits to landowners rather than land operators,
benefits may go disproportionately, to. owner/operators (although rental
values of land should adjust to. prevent .long-term advantages for owner/
operators relative to rental operators)... . policies may also dispropor
tionately harm or- benefit full-time, farmers^ relative.to operations with,
earnings from off-farm work. In particular, if-policies benefit labor-
intensive operations such as farrowing operations,, they may attract more
support from full-time farmers,
• Policies will' also differ in their short-run and long-run. duplica
tions for farm profitability;' Therefore, a farmer's time horizon may r
determine-the type of policies he supports. Farmers-'who are financially
stressed would prefer policies that target benefits to those in danger*
of insolvency. On the other hwd, financially-secure operators may
oppose such policies, -both because they gain nothing from them and
because they stand to lose potential opportunities for expansion of
their own operations. This latter incentive will be strongest for
operators who-have a larger net worth against-which to borrow in order
to acquire new land and capital. 'Younger operators are: more likely to .
support policies that will increase'long-term profitability, whereas
older operators may-prefer shorter-term policies. Operators who have .
dependents may prefer long-term policies- if they plan'to pass the operar
tion on to their children. '
'• Finally', macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates, moneta^
policy, exchange rates, and foreign agricultural policy may be relevant
elements of the information set. In general, farmers will hold
different e:q)ectations of the future paths of these variables. However;
data on individual expectations are not available, and publicly avail
able information on these macroeconomic variables-, at the time of the
survey would be common to all agents in:our sample. . In.practice, therer
fore, we have no variation in these'variables across observations and
their impacts are incorporated in the constant term. We discuss the
empirical specification of the information set dn the next section.
_ hi; data . .
Data for- estimating the model. are.:tiaken from the Farm Finance
Survey of Iowa farm operators conducted vin March of 1987 (Edelman and .
Olsen)'; In addition to the demographic and. financial-rstatus; variables,,
farmers* preferences about four; agricultural .policy, positions were-also-
collected. These options include:.. a) continuing.the current prpgram-
with minor revisions, b) adopt mandatory-supply controls if. approved in
a referendum, c) move to a-market-oriented policy by..decoupling, .wd
d) target'financial, assistance .toi farmersiie^^eriencing the n^st severe .
8/
financial stress.- 'The possible range of, responses. these options,
are: a) agree, b). not. sure, and c). disagree. -^The san^le consists pf .,
515 households. The age and farm size distribution of the respondents
were similar to those in the;;Census of, Agriculture for Iowa and were
judged to be .representative, of commerci&l. farm operators, (Edelman^aiid
Olsen).' c.'.
The. tabulation of..responses by survey, participants is .reported at.
the top for Table:!. : The proposal-t0\continue^ current.,programs had the
highest level of support..:(57.i 6; percent) ,' follpwed-by, the decoupling ..
option (40; 1 percent). The mandatory..control option had the>highest
level of opposition :(53.5; percent):, followed:by the proposal to target;
assistance to-most financially stressed^farmers (46.1 percent). ..The ..
proposal to continue-current progr^rhad the^lowest level of,^opposition
(14.6 percent) ; Decoupling generated the largest proportion,.of
undecided-responses (34.5 percent).::
'The'explanatory variables include,a list of.human-capital
variables, farm and^financial status indicators,,and a life-cycle
10^
variable. The human capital variables include traditional measures of
age, level of school-attainment for husband and i^fe, number of
dependents under 18, and years in farming. Farm characteristics include
number of-acres operated, percentage of acres ovned, type of farming
operation, and gross farm income. Indicators of farm, financial
situation include net worth of the farm, dollars of off-farm income, and
a ranking of financial stress based on debt-to-asset ratio and cash flow
measures.-^ Hie number of dependents is included both as a measure of
available labor and as a possible indicator of long-term considerations
in retaining the farm through the next- generation. The meaiis and
standard error's of these variables are presented in the'second part of
Table 1.' " ...
IV. ' EMPIRICAL RESULTS" ^ :
' likelihood probit^ estimates of the reduced form equations
for the four agricultural policy options are presented in Table 2. The
regressors' were all* rescaled to lie between -10 and 10 to help the
estimation converge. The ordered prbbit procedure estimates were
obtained using LIBDEP.—^ Accompanying the parameter estimates is an
interpretation of the results as elasticities which are' presented in
Table 3. These elasticities are calculated by evaluating .the predicted .
probability of support for a given policy from a 10 percent change in an
individual exogenous variable. As noted in the .theoretical section, the
farmers' responses are interpreted as the difference between the
conditional and unconditional estimate of the farmer's expected profit.
The results provide a' picture of what type of farmers are more likely to
support or oppose a particular agricultural policy option and the
11
sensitivity of farmers', opinions, to chafes in economiciand financial-,
conditions; . .
Generally, the results indicate-^that various.groups wi^ specific,
views are more distinguishable for two-of the four policy options:
targeting assistwce to fin^cially stressed'farmers"and the mandatory
supply controls in- relation to their unconditional estimates'. Thxs is .
si^gested by-the higher humber-of-significant coefficients for the . •
various variables in these'alternativiss; The-other two policy options.-
examined in this model, continuing current programs and decoupling had
less identifiable camps of support or'opposition as indicated by fewer -
significant" coefficients. Still; the Chi-Squared-test of the null
hypothesis'that hone of the variables e3q)lained farmers' opinions, on
policy was easily rejected'in each equation.'' ' .
The information on response -elasticities in Table 3 indicates'that
farm support for'the existing farm program is very insensitive to
changes in:farm financial position or farm characteristics. :The
percentage change in the probability of support from a ten percent
change in the various ^ogenous variables exceeds, one-percent for onlyj
one variable,'years on farm;'' The^support . for decoupling is also quite,
insensitive, with only three variables resulting in responses that
exceed one-percent in absolute value. :..In contrast, support .for; -
mandatory controls and targeting to fiscally stressed farmers ,1ms
consistently higher elasticities i although no response is larger tl^- 10
percent. ' J.'y. •
'-The-analysis of the mandatory control and targeting options
provides the most interesting -results, c^e. mandatory supply cpntrol.
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option seeks to increase farm prices and returns by reducing planted
acres. Larger farms would have a larger production base and would
receive a proportionately larger benefit from any price.increase.- Our
results indicate that with other variables held constwt, Iowa farms,
with larger acreages support mandatory controls, although farmers with.
higher gross farm income ^d net worth tended to oppose this, option.—^
Farmers with livestock operations tended to oppose mandatory controls.
Less-educated farmers and their spouses tended to support mandatory
controls. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with
higher levels of human capital will prefer policies that increase .
decision-making flexibility, thus making.human capital'more iiq)ortant.
Increasing levels of farm stress were also associated with increasing^
support for mandatory controls, although, not at a significant level.
There were also several very, identifiable characteristics of
supporters for targeting financial assistance to the more severely
stressed farm operators.* As^the degree.of -financial stress Increases,-
the degree of support for targeting increases significantly. Curiously,
higher gross farm income was associated with increased support for
targeting, but higher net worth decreased support. The effect of net
worth was more significant with an elasticity nearly twice as large ,
as the effect of gross' farm Income. . Also Interesting was tl^t more
experienced farmers tended to support targeting fiscal stress.
Apparently the tendency of farmers^ with shorter time horizons to prefer
policies aimed at short-term profits outweighs the tendency of those
with more human capital" to support .policies allowing, more flexibility.
More-educated farm spouses supported targeted benefits but more-
13
educated farmers opposed the policy. Although not significant, crop aiid
livestock fanners tehdiBd to support targeting.
There are fever identifiable groups ^isupporting or opposing the
option for decoupling; Farmers supporting decoupling.tend to have fever.
acres^but have-a higher net vorth relative-to those farmers yho are.
12/opposed to this option.—" The paucity, of significant., identifiable -
support or opposition- to the decoupling:', option may be becaiue the
proposal vas' too nev and not yet understood so that .many farmers my. •
have not yet formed firm opinion .on .the policy's; intact on - -
profitability. The relatively high 23 percent:of farmers undecided
suggests that many are still seeking infprmtibn on:the option;: r. ;
• The only significant" coefficient. in the'regression e3q>laining.
support for the current program is the negative:effect qn support, of^the.
number of dependents • -Even in this case'i the elasticity is e^remely
small, 'Within our framework, the lack of significant relationships,
could indicate that the probability of continuing the. current programs
is so high that there is' no significant difference between the
conditional and unconditional .ejqiected'profit. While our results •
suggest that 'there is some' measurable lack .of, constituent support-, for
the current program-, it also means that there: is no significant r c
identifiable canp of opposition. The iii5)lication,-is that it would.be
difficult to organize a constituent interest group in opposition.to. the
current program because of the difficulty in.identifying a farmer-type
that opposes the existing policy. 'The lack of'^y c^s, as-identified
by the farm characteristics, for-or against the current program also
suggests that program benefits have been distributed widely enbugh that
14
all. groups feel they have benefited, this process of developing a farm
policy that incorporates financial benefits for divergent groups removes
opposition but (perhaps equally iaport^t) also prevents any
identifiable constituent group of farmers, from benefiting from the
policy uniquely. The other farm policy options reviewed in this paper
have groups of strong supporters among farmers who are. likely to receive,:
significant benefits. However, there are also farmer groups opposing
these optionsi which can prevent the adoption of these programs. .
Acon5)arison of coefficients arid elasticities across equations
suggests several general conclusions. First, the coefficients for iig,,
are highly significant, indicating fanners' policy choices are
consistent with-risk-averse behavior. The largest estimate of iig
decoupling and the smallest is for mandatory controls, indicating that
the forecast error variance for expected profits is highest for
decoupling and lowest for mandatory controls. Farmers' opii^ons on
policies are most sensitive to a farmer's net worth, level of financial
stability, farm income, and size of operation. Afarmer's human
capital, age, and type of operation also influence his opinions on some
policies. The proportion of acreage "owned or the level of off-farm
income do not affect farmers' opinions. While some anomalies occur,
most of the findings-are consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis,
although other explanations can clearly be advanced.
•' The results from this.section provide an economic rationale for why
farmers tend to support different types of farm policies.. The most
striking finding from this analysis is that farm support for the
15
existing farm programs is virtuallyinsensitive- to changes in farm
financial position or farm characteristics': While support for mandatory
controls atid targeting of program benefits' to-financially stressed .
farmers has consistently higher elasticities, none is larger than the
10 percent change in a given factor.' ^e iji^lication is that large
changes in farm characteristics or financial position would-be required".-
to alter farmers' opinions significantly away from existing programs.
V, TEST FOR CONSISTENCY OF CONSTITUENT INTERESTS
The previous section describes what types of farmers seem to favor
or reject various policy alternatives. Howevereven though the results
seem to indicate tlmt there are, identifiable c^s of support for and
against these policies, we have not,formally tested whether these canps
are, in fact, •significantly distinct. For exan5>le, it would be.valuable,
to determine if the parties favoring mandatory controls object to the
alternative policies or whether ihdiyidi^ls favoring.mandatory controls
also, favor, any alternative• to the. current pplicy*. A. test of the
hypothesis that these policies have identifiable camps of support and
opposition is if a farmer with a high, probability of accepting one
policy has a low probability of accepting alternative. poHcies. If
the farm policies, considered do not generate uzuque,can^s. of support,
then-there .would be no systematic relationship between the .probability
of supporting one-policy relative to another. If two policies have
similar.can^s of support, then there should be a positive correlation
between the probability of supporting .the two policies. Obviously, the
latter two cases would make it easier for any given policy to be
implemented without significant organized opposition. However, the
16
first case, where there is significant,negative correlation between the
probability of accepting any two policies, would. ia5)ly that in^lementing
a given policy would be more likely to generate significant.organized
opposition.
This.discussion suggests a second specification for the information.
seti which includes the predicted probabilities that the individ^l
accepts the other policies as additional regressors,. In particular, for.
any policy i, we would specify:
(6) n^(o^) - n°(Q ) ° + t Pr. (y.- 2) + ,,
® j=i J J
where Pr (Yj» 2) is the probability that the individual would approve of
policy j, and 0^ is the" effect of the probability bf approval of policy ,
. J i . .
on the expected relative profitability of policy i. If fij.is positive,
then individuals who expect to benefit froin j also eacpect' to benefit
from i. If flj is negative, then individuals who expect to benefit from
j e3q)ect to lose from i. If 6j is small numerically and statistically, '
then there is no systematic relationship between support for .policies j .
and i.
The probability of acceptance of policy i is 1 - F •
where F(*) 4s the standard normal cumulative distribution func^on, -
is the estimated threshold coefficient, and is the estimated value
of - n°. Because of the nonlineafities of the relationship, we could
generate probabilities of policy acceptance for each farmer by using the
results reported in Table 2. As an added precaution to insure identifi
cation, we reestimated the predicted'probabilities of acceptance with
17
regional duimny variables,-the farmer's age;-and the square of his age
included in the'infonnation set as additional identifiers. We then
added these predicted probabilities to our original ordered.-probit
specification",' These results are reported iii Table;4:with PRTARG,
PRMAND, PRpEC, and PRCONT representing, respectively, the. predicted
probabilities that-the fanner approves/of targeting financial stress,
mandatory•production controls, decoupling," and continuation, of the^ .
current program." The results, stronglyrsupport the conjecture ,that.,there
exist strong and consistent can^s of support (and, hence, opposition)
for all the policy alternatives considered. f-All but one of the/coeffi-.
cients on the'predicted probabilitiies are; negative, the exception being
a-positive'but insignificant effect of.the-probability of accepting
mandatory controls on the esqiected relative profitability of decoupling.
On the other hand, significant-negative^effects on decoupling support
occur as the probability incre'asesr..of accepting either, targeting
financial stress' or continuing the e^xisting, program. -.Similarly.
predicted support for decoupling significantly, reduces support for
continuing'the existing program, predicted support; for targeti^ aid or
decoupling significantly reduces support for.mandatory, controls, and
predicted support- for' decoupling is significantly negatively, correlated
with su^ort for targeting financialistress. . :
The joint test of the significance-of-the coefficients on predicted
support for alternative policies also-lends support.for the hypo^esis
that strong can^s of interest exist^in support .for or opposition to
these-policies. The restriction that the fij are jointly equal, to zero
18
is distributed Chi-Squared with three degrees of freedom. The test
statistic is confuted as two tines the difference in the values of the
log-likelihood functions between Table 2.and Table A,. Ihese Chi-Squared
statistics are reported at the bottom of Table A. The results show that
the h^othesis of no intact of predicted support for alternative
policies is rejected at the ,10 level for targeting financial stress,
mandatory controls; and decoupling. Hie hypothesis; is: not.rejected at ,
the .10 level for continuing the current program, although the- ,
hypothesis would be rejected at a slightly higher marginal significance
level. The iji5)lication of the joint tests is that all the policies,
with the possible exception of the existing program, face significant
joint opposition as well as individual opposition from supporters of the
alternative policies. . ,
VI. .SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This, study-developed ,a theoretical; model of farmers' opinion
formation, which relates a fanner's support of opposition on a policy -
option to the farmer's-expected profit from the policy. -An en5>irical
strategy was proposed for mapping -the theoretical model to a data set.
Specifically, we showed that the model leads directly to an ordered
probit specification. The estimated coefficients were interpretable as
comparative static effects of a given factor on expected profit under a
given policy relative to the unconditional effect of the factor on
expected profit. The sign and significance of the.coefficients were
used to determine the type of fanners who support or oppose a given
policy option.
19
The eii5)irical teat ofthe model yielded.many interesting results. .
Among these,„we,rfound t^t. a farmer's financial circu^tance stroi^ly.
influences his^policy opinions, as does the size of^his operation* A
farmer's-education,. fann^^erience,^and.;type, of operation also
influence his opinions. In most casesthe. pattern of support for ,a
given policy is. consistent T^th expectations ,concerni^ how the policy
will affect a farmer's profits.
The results show that farmers' support of mandatory controls or
targeting fiscal stress are relatively sensitive to changes in farmers',
economic and personal characteristics but that support for the existing
farm program is virtually insensitive to these changes. The iji5>lication
is that large general increases in farm fiscal stress or large general
reductions in farm net worth would be necessa^ to shift farm opinion
away from the current program and toward an alternative farm program.
The results also show the existence of identifiable and distinct
pflmpg of support for and against alternative farm policies. Increasing
the probability that a farmer supports a given policy reduces the
probability that the farmer will support th^ alternative policies. This
result further supports the conclusion that it will be difficult to
shift support away from the current program. Farmers who favor
targeting, not only oppose the existing program, but also oppose
mandatory controls and decoupling as well. This in^lies that it would
be difficult to build a constituency against the existing program by
uniting faraers who prefer any specific alternative.
The success of this particular application shows promise for
further research into the economics of farmers' opinions on agricultural
20
policy. It would be interesting to see if the results •found herein
would generalize to'other states. Also interesting would be a sample
that allows a con5)arison of farmers' opinions at'different points in
time, allowing ail exaMnatibn of the predictive power of the model.
Finally, a panel study would be usiaful in examining the persistence
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This could, also be called a vealth-maxiiiiizing hypothesis since the
value of land and-property holdings-should..reflect the present value
^of e^^ectedrfuture profits,. Notice that our analysis can also be put
in a utility-maujnizing..framework .where.,d^ected profit entersvthe.
utility function with positive'marginal-utility. - ,
2/
- These could alternatively^ be viewed. as"p611cy: regies-since a^giyen
policy may have several policy subcon^onents• iThus. a policy;S^
might be composed of policies S2 and'S^ implemented'jointly> .;
However, bur. e^irical wdrk'cohcentrates..on distinct policy types*.
3/
-- Note that we'assume that the s^e. ihfonnation-r set applies to all
' policies. This assunqption is innocuous:.since a given piece, of
information can always be. given^a. weight of zero (i«e«, ignored) if
it is irrelevant. Therefore^ should be, viewed as the. general,set
of information: available, to .the; farmer, -v . .; .-. '
4/
- Presumably.',;, a farmer's, opinion .on whether or not be prefers that.a v
policy should be iji^lemented is not related to the probability., that
the policy will actiially be iinplemented. ^In other words, we assume ;
that a farmer will^ escpress support, fprj a given policy, i if its
conditional expected present value;.of profit, TI^(P^) exceeds. 11°(Q^) ,
even if F^, the probability,of policy i beuig .ii^lemented; is very
small;'^ ... v
If a farmer is riskrneutral,' he.will only be concerned about the.
first momentro£ expected profits and win;.not wor^ about the ...
distribution of e3q>ected,profitTherefore, he. will only be
; indifferent to-a^ policy.: if its •conditional .ejected profit is. equal
24
FOOTNOTES (continued)
to n®. Thus, an interval of indifference |i2^» would only occur
if farmers* opinions were influenced by higher-order moments of the
distribution of esqiected future profits* It:should be noted. that~ the
confidence interval iyiy need not be symmetric, about zero.
Agents may, for example, set-|ij"" 0in. order to. decrease the
probability of supporting a policy that,will have a-negative
realization of profit.
This technique was first developed by McKelvey and Zavoina.
Notice that an insignificant coefficient, does not imply that the
factor is hot important in generating profit, only that it is nei^er-
more nor less profitable than^average under a given policy. Thus, if
a characteristic is equally profitable across-all policies, it will
have a zero coefficient in all regressions, ' -
The wording of the questions is contained in the Appendix.
—^ The process used to generate the fin^cial'Stress classes ,is outlined
in the Appendix. " '
—^See Greene pp. 170-171 for details.
—^The finding that- farm size and support for mandatory controls are
positively correlated might seem surprising, and it varies with
studies that have looked at average support by .farm size group.
Interestingly, our results are consistent with economic theory but
are contrary to popular perceptions. Our findings illustrate the.
value of comparative static analysis. The-iinplications of our
analysis is that support for maiidatory controls increases as farm
acreage increases if we hold gross farm income and net worth
25
FOOTNOTES (continued)
constant. The pattern of support by acreage in the other studies may
be masked by the dominance of the negatively related net worth and
gross.farm income variables.
—^Once again, this result is"consistent *dth economic theory biit
contrary to popular perceptions. in footnote 10, the reason that
larger farms •may be viewed as more ;Supportive of decoupling may be
attributable to the fact that they have, higher average net. worth, and-
net worth is positively correlated with support for decoupling.
f-f .
26
















.419 Support for decoupling benefits with
Qsoppose, l^indifferent, and 2ssupport
.559 Support for continuing current programs
with Qsoppose, 1-indifferent, and 2BSUpport
^240 Support for targeting benefits to
financially stressed farmers wit^ O*oppose,
• l"indifferent, and 2=support
.201
IBDEFENbEHT VASIABLES
Support for mandatory supply.controls with




EDUC ^ 12 .541 .498 Punmiy variable equal to one for farmers with
a high school education or less
SPOUSE EDUC ^ 12 .466 .499 DumnQT variable equal to one if the farmer's
wife has a high school education or less -
YRS ON FARM 29.82 11.36 Years in farming
CROPS .564 .337 Proportion of farm gross returns from crops
LVSTK .334 .322 Proportion of farm gross returns from
livestock
DAIRY .029 .119 Proportion of farm gross returns from dairy
FIKST2 .228 .42 Dumny variable equal to one for farmers in
moderate financial stress category
FINST3 .144 ^351 Dummy variable equal to one for farmers
in financially stressed category
FINST4 .109 .312 Dummy variable equal to one for farmers
in the financially insolvent category
ACRTOT 466.5 327.14 Total acres in farm operation
GFI 128,210 116,940 Gross farm income in 1986
ACRPERC .679 .916 Proportion of total acres owned
OFF86 10,859 13,339 Off-farm income in 1986
DEPIB .847 1.28 Number of dependents under 18
1JW87 253,100 240,260 Net worth of farmer in Jan. 1987
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Standard errors in parentheses, set = 0
* Significant at .10 level.
** Significant at .05 level.

































































as a normalization restriction.
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a/
Table *3. Estimated Elasticities of Support for Agricultural Policy Options=
DECOUPLE CONTPROG TARGETFS • MANDCONT
HSH - 0,236 0.409 1.166 2.304
HSW 0.092 - 0,448 . - 1.414 0.068
YRSFARM 0.333 1.381 8.691 • 1.73




DAIRY 0.256 - 0.126 0.036 0.136
FINST2 0.05 - 0.537 0.2636 - 0.34
FINST3 0.053 ^ 0.148 1.388 . 0.019
FINST4 0.292 •- 0.055 ^ • 1.347 ^ 0.411
ACRTOT - 2.094 . 0.881 0.457 4.212
GFI 0.286 0.430 2.369 - 3.619
ACRPERC O.ilA - 0.050 0.302 0.033
OFF86 0.570 •; 0.017 , 0,117 0.438
DEPia 0.130 . . - 0.647 0.905 - 0.272
NW87 1.615 0.390 - 4.374 - 2.513
PR(Z=2) '.A2A .555 .209 .182
—^These numbers are the percentage change in the probability of supj
the policy, given a 10 percent increase in-the specified exogenouE
holding all other variables at their sample mean. PR(Z=2) repress
predicted probability of supporting the given policy evaluated at
means.
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.4448**GDUC ^ 12 .0454 • 2495
(.1510)' (.1722) (.1543) ' (.1784)
.SPOUSE ED S 12 : . -.2642 -.2502 ' -.3139** -.3092
(.1689) (.1600) •• (.1444) •" (.2451)
YRS OH FARM . .1713*' .1900* • .2551*** .2974*
(.1020)- (.ll43) j (.0706) (.1720)
CROPS -;2673 -.5355 - -.4355 -.6908
(.4046) (.4868) ; (.4865) ^ (.4784)
LVSTK .0774 -.3612 -.1089 - -.3943
• (.4394); -^(;4561) (^4537) (.4083)
DAIRY -.0373 .5284 .7398 1.5994*
(.7271) ,(.8127) - (.7836) „ (.7085)
FINST2 .2157 .1477 .2886** .2404
(.1864) (.1947) (.1420) . (.2278)
FINST3 .2949-.. .3800 V! ; .6090*** .8677*^
(.3112) (.3991) (.1826) (.4213)
FINST4 .6307 1.0501 1.2830*** 1.939**
(.4032) (.6745) (.3218) (.8069)
ACRTOT -.3941 -.0734 -.2451 -.0121
(.3021) (.2945) (.3127) (.3505)
GFI .2247 .1161 .1605* .0190
(.1404) (.0892) (.0961) (.1578)
ACRPERC .0180 .0239 .0416 .0684
(.0809) (.0658) (.0698) (.0662)
0FF86 .0739 .0726 .0786 .0940
(.0460) (.0593) (.0545) (.0733)
PEP18 -.0593 -.0628 -.0022 .0283
(.0729) (.0636) (.0744) (.0785)
NW87 .0452 .0106 -.0332 -.0700










—^ Standard errors in parentheses, set = 0 as a rionnalization restriction.
* Significant at .10 level.
** Significant at .05 level; •
***Signific^t at ,01 level.
'^^ Test of the null hypothesis that predicted support for the three alternative




















































What should be the future direction in farm policy?
a. Continue present voluntary programs which
provide government price and income
supports in return for acreage reduction.
b. Move to market-oriented policy by decoupling
and phasing down income supports over a
period of yeara.
c. Implement higher price supports and mandatory
production controls if approved in a farmer
referendum*
d. Target more farm program spending toward the





The financial stress variables (FINST) are a composite indicator based
on combinations of debt-to-asset ratios and cash flow to equity ratios
(Edelman and Olsen). The original financial classification scoring system
defined four classes. Class 1 farms are financially strong and possess low
debt-to-assets and high cash flow to equity ratios. Class 2 farms are
financially stable. Class 3 farms are financially weak. Class A farms are
severely stressed with high debt-to-asset ratios and negative cash flow to
equity ratios. In the estimation procedure, the most financially secure
category (FINSTl) is used as the reference classification with the remaining
variables acting as dummy variables (FINST2, FINST3, and FINST4).
